Chapter 3

Complementary Segmentary Opposition, Early Kingship and the Looming State

Bridging the Dichotomy of African Political Systems

Simon Simonse

The Dichotomy of Acephalous Societies and Centralized Societies

In their introduction to *African Political Systems*, the two editors, Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, posit a distinction between two types of precolonial political organization prevalent in Africa:[1] societies that are defined by a centralized authority and administrative and judicial institutions (labelled Group A in the book); and societies that consist of a number of corporate groups of roughly equal size and power that are defined by relations of agnatic kinship and that lack a central authority and administrative and judicial institutions (labelled Group B in the book).

The introduction by Meyer Fortes and Evans-Pritchard is followed by eight case studies by the eminent Africanist anthropologists of the day. Five discuss societies of Group A: the Zulu kingdom (South Africa), the chieftaincies of the Ngwato, a tribe of the Tswana ethnic group (Botswana), the Bemba chiefdoms (Zambia), the Ankole kingdom (Uganda), and the Kede state (Nupe, Nigeria). The other three chapters deal with Group B societies: the Bukusu and Maragoli, the two largest tribes of the Luhya ethnic conglomerate (Kenya), the Tallensi of Ghana, and the Nuer of South Sudan.

The case studies are presented independently of one another. In line with the structural-functionalist approach, the emphasis of the studies is on demonstrating the internal coherence of the political systems, not their relationship with the other cases in the book or their insertion in one of the two categories of political systems identified by the editors. The idea that

there might be structural continuity between the two types, including the possibility of a society converting from one type of political system to the other is only raised once (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940: 9–10) and then as a process brought about by external factors (conquest). Any further investigation in this direction is discouraged as futile because of a supposed lack of relevant ethnographic information (ibid.: 10). In this chapter, I will present an ethnographic case where the structural continuity between societies of Group A and Group B is clearly visible. We shall see that this continuity lights up when we focus our analysis on the manner in which social consensus is generated and reproduced. It was Evans-Pritchard's genius to see that Nuer social segments did not have a reality of their own and that they only assumed corporate existence in opposition to segments of the same order of social inclusion. I will call the underlying dynamic of this manner of group formation *consensual antagonism* and, following Evans-Pritchard, its manifestation in the political reality of a segmentary society *balanced opposition*. I will argue that the operation of the institution of kingship in the *monyomiji cluster* in South Sudan can be understood as a *balancing of power* between the king and the people, driven by *consensual antagonism.*

Table 3.1 Types of precolonial political organization prevalent in Africa (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940: 5–6)

Group A	Group B
The sociopolitical cohesion of the society is based on sharing a single central authority	The sociopolitical cohesion of the units that make up the society is based on their opposition to one another, and on their fusion in more inclusive units whose cohesion is based on opposition with groups of the same order
The identity of the sociopolitical unit is defined by its central authority and has territorial boundaries	The identity and the boundaries of the sociopolitical units on different levels of segmentary inclusion (clans, subclans, lineages, etc.) is defined by descent from a common ancestor
Power is played out in the relationship between the central authority and its subjects	Power is played out in the rivalry between complementary social segments
The exercise of power is regulated by notions of complementary obligations and duties between rulers and subjects that include protection on the side of the ruler and payment of tribute on the side	The balance of power between complementary segments tends towards an equilibrium and is kept in check by the need for joint mobilization and collaboration of minor segments in confrontations

of the subjects; abuse of power by the central authority is kept in check by the possibility of rebellion	at the next higher level of social segmentation, etc.
The capacity to include ethnically heterogeneous groups is expedited by the relative ease with which new groups can attach and subordinate themselves to a central authority and by the interest the recipient authority has to extend its authority to new groups, resulting in a diversification of the population of the kingdom	The capacity to include ethnically heterogeneous groups is impeded by the necessity of a minimum of social integration and cultural assimilation before newcomers can fully participate in the relatively egalitarian decision-making of the recipient communities, resulting in the maintenance of socio-cultural homogeneity
Social cohesion underpinned by common attachment to mystical values and sacred symbols embodied in the central authority	Social cohesion underpinned by pride in one's group identity and by the traditions and ritual powers vested in the descent groups

Second, I will demonstrate that this *balancing of power* between the king and the people in the *monyomiji* cluster had the potential of transforming itself into processes of state-formation. I will present Buganda as an example of a state that could have resulted from a transformation of the type of *consensual antagonism* that made the early kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster tick.

Consensual Antagonism

The idea that social groups derive identity and cohesion from their being in opposition to other groups is now common knowledge. René Girard[2] has discovered the full anthropological significance of this commonplace knowledge. It is not just a cognitive effect that helps us organize our social world, but an essential moment in the operation of what Girard calls 'the scapegoat mechanism' that channels our mimetic proneness to violence in ways that enable us to manage it and stay together in relative peace.

Humans have lost the instinctual inhibitions that protect animal species against self-destructive violence. We are not just mimetic in competing for food, territory and mating partners as animals are, but also in our passions, in the very motivation as to what we want and who we want to be. To define our desires and aspirations, we copy others who serve as models. This imitation inescapably nurtures a wish to replace the model and makes human conflict unavoidable, ubiquitous, and more complex and lethal than animal conflict.

Once a community suffers aggravated, self-destructive conflict, people may close ranks in blaming a single person for being the cause of their misery and may subsequently eliminate him or her. When that point has been passed, the tension relaxes and a new sense of togetherness, 'peace', descends on the group. In retrospect, the expelled victim often assumes a benevolent aspect because of the transformation triggered by his or her death. This is how the scapegoat mechanism allows humans to overcome crisis: an act of limited violence targeting an individual or minority stops and neutralizes an outbreak of larger-scale violence. An alternative to the scapegoating of one of the group's members is an attack on outsiders or on an enemy. War unites not only the attacking community but also the attacked community. Scapegoating carries the risk of creating deep internal divisions in the group, while in warfare, the risk of the use of violence that is disproportionate in relation to the cause of the crisis is greater. Often warrior societies achieve an effective synergy in waging war at a limited cost in terms of human victims.

Consensual antagonism is a collective term including both the scapegoating of a single or minority victim and the reciprocal victimizing between enemies (Simonse 2017: 13–23). *Sacrifice* is the *controlled* enactment of the scapegoat mechanism: the victim, usually a domestic animal, standing in for the group as a whole, is killed and believed to take the causes of acrimony, illness and other evils with it in its death. This is the oldest religious practice.

Girard builds on Durkheim's idea that the sense of the sacred is the foundation of human society. The *sacred* consists of all those shared representations that make the members of a particular society distinct and united. Girard transforms Durkheim's concept of the *sacred* from within. From a mere 'representation' of society, Girard's *sacred* carries the traces of the collective expulsion of the victim. Girard thus provides a rationale for Durkheim's observation that the sacred is ambivalent in nature, simultaneously auspicious and pure, and dangerous and polluting. The dangerous, inauspicious side of the experience of the sacred evokes the victim charged with the community's ills *before* its elimination, while the auspicious experience evokes the purified air of peace *after* its expulsion.

The idea, defended by Durkheim's pupil and nephew Mauss, that sacrifice is primarily a transaction between humans and a supernatural being in which the human partner expects divine blessings in return for his offering is a late

elaboration, in response to the emergence of personal deities. It leaves the question of why the offering is almost always a victim of killing unexplained.

Girard also distances himself from Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, which defines culture as an essentially cognitive construct. For Girard, culture has a practical purpose: that of keeping the human community at peace. Because of this, Girard's approach may not look very different from structural-functionalism. Yet the window that Girard opens on human relations is not reductionist. In our analysis, we are invited to empathize with the actors and the drama in which they find themselves. This drama is never closed to the possibility of crisis. Structural-functionalism contents itself in establishing a common-sense practical coherence between different social levels – economy, social organization and religion – in a bounded social field at a particular point in time.

Conceiving of culture as essentially a means to overcome crisis and intra-specific violence, Girard is comfortable with the fundamentals of Darwinism.[3] He is not an evolutionist in the sense that he considers the state, for example, as an achievement qualifying its rulers and subjects as representing a 'higher' level of human civilization. The outcome of the 7,000-year-old state experiment on whose possible beginnings this article comments is still far from definitive, animated as it is by a potentially destructive dynamic that continues to escape human control (Girard 2007).

The *Monyomiji* Cluster

The ethnographic data I will use for my demonstration come from a group of South Sudanese societies that combine institutions of complementary segmentary opposition with institutions of kingship. I have labelled them 'the *monyomiji* cluster' after their most striking institution: the *monyomiji*. The approximately twenty ethnic groups practising *monyomiji* rule inhabit the mountainous east bank of the Nile on the latitude of Juba, the South Sudanese capital.[4] The *monyomiji* are the owners (*monye*) of the community (*miji*), the age-grade of middle-aged men that carries the responsibility for public affairs and war. Since they collectively take power, rule and retire, it is customary to call them a *generation*, though the members of successive generations are not necessarily biological fathers and sons, as is the case among the generation-sets of the Karimojong cluster. The *monyomiji* stay in power for a fixed number of years. The number of years varies between

ethnic groups from as much as twenty-four years in some Lopit communities to twelve or fewer among the Lokoya, Pari and Lulubo. The moment when a new generation-set takes over is also determined by the balance of power between the ruling *monyomiji* and the junior age-cohorts campaigning to take over. This power balance is determined by the military and political reputation of the sitting generation, and by the numbers and combativeness of the juniors. In English, the *monyomiji* are commonly referred to as the *ruling generation*.

Each community also has a king. The king is a Rainmaker as well as a political and military leader. His political interests are not necessarily the same as those of the *monyomiji*. The king and the *monyomiji* regularly find themselves at opposite ends of the political spectrum, most flagrantly in rain crises, when the *monyomiji* will blame the king for withholding the rain. The king will retort by insisting that the *monyomiji* put their house in order, stop their conflicts, settle unpaid debts and take appropriate ritual action on the taboos that have been violated in order for the rain to fall.

During the period preceding their accession to power, the would-be *monyomiji* cultivate a lowly opinion of the achievements of the retiring generation. They will campaign for renewal and revitalization of the country. They will want to imbue neighbouring communities with respect for their power and lobby for one of their age-mates in the royal clan to be made king. A young king is likely to share the *monyomiji*'s interest in establishing a reputation that will be commemorated in stories and songs by future generations.

Complementary Segmentary Opposition

The *monyomiji* of a particular community relate to *monyomiji* in neighbouring communities according to the dynamic of complementary segmentary opposition that Evans-Pritchard in *African Political Systems* described and analysed for the Nuer. In the event of war, the *monyomiji* of different communities combine so that armies of matching political scope and size will face one another. The difference with the Nuer is that these groupings are not mobilized on the basis of genealogical closeness, but on the basis of neighbourliness, ethnic affinity, historic precedents and political convenience. While there is an awareness of the need to maintain an overall political equilibrium, there are historical cases of deliberately or

accidentally unbalanced confrontations that caused powerful polities to collapse.[5]

One of the measures to manage the balance of forces between neighbouring communities is the synchronization of the handing over of generational power. In the western part of the *monyomiji* area, it was the rule that the Pari in the north would be the first to hand over power to the junior generation, followed by Liria and the other Lokoya villages, while the Lulubo, furthest south, would be the last to respond to the wave of politico-military change (Kurimoto 1998: 29–50). Evans-Pritchard mentions the synchronization of age-sets among the Nuer. Calling the age-system 'the most characteristic of all Nuer national institutions' (Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 289), he describes how smaller tribes time their initiation to make it coincide with that of the larger tribes. The synchronization of tribal initiations, according to him, serves to maintain an equilibrium between different tribes and tribal coalitions. 'Tribes' among the Nuer are defined as the smallest units that wage war. Like *monyomiji*-sets, coeval Nuer age-sets often adopt the same name.

Complementary opposition not only defines relations between independent political communities, but also structures the relations between different sections within the same kingdom. The kingdom of Liria, for example, has nine territorial sections that are arranged in a semicircle from west to northeast along the foot[6] of Oponi Mountain. As they belong to the same kingdom, sections do not fight to kill. Spears and bloodshed are taboo in intersectional fights; only sticks are allowed. If bloodshed occurs, the fight is stopped and the matter is taken to the *monyomiji* assembly of the kingdom or to the king.

In stick-fights, the sections adjacent to those that started the fighting join their immediate neighbour, 'to maintain the existing equilibrium', as one Lirian informant put it. Since the application of this principle is risky for the sections located at the extreme ends of the semicircle, the three western sections concluded a 'non-aggression pact' to prevent Okimu, at the extreme west, from being pushed out of Liria. This troika has its own name: 'Wurewure'. The general expectation is that stick-fights can settle conflicts between sections.

When fights escalate, sections further away than the immediate neighbours of the conflict parties move in. In such cases, the fight tends to stabilize in a polarized confrontation between the two moieties, Orinyak and Opwalang.

At this level of social segmentation, the problem can only be solved by the overall *monyomiji* assembly or by the king, or by the two in conjunction. If the king is called in, a tripartite division of Liria, comes into operation: Ovwara, the king's section, which is also the location of the central ceremonial ground of the kingdom, acts as a separate division (Ovwotong, a mini-section adjacent to Ovwara, being counted as part of the central division). The tripartite division also applies in the competition between the more playful girls' age-sets.

Most forms of competition (sports, cultivation for the king, etc.) are moiety-based. The moieties have their own 'Masters of Bows' who bless the tools of warfare. Other important offices (Masters of Land, Grain, Fertility and Wind) are centralized like the office of the king, except for the extreme, northeasterly section of Ongole, which is inhabited by the remnants of the people who occupied the mountain before the present invaders. Ongole still has its Masters of Land, Grain, the Mountain and Wind, but the Rain and the rainstones – emblems of royal power – were seized by the leader of the invaders.

While the balancing of power that goes on between sections and moieties may look predictable, it is not automatic. There is always the possibility that things will go drastically wrong. At the time of my fieldwork, a gang of youngsters of the section of Ohwa had committed murders in other sections. The *monyomiji* of Ohwa were unable to correct the behaviour of these hooligans. Ohwa lost all its friends around the mountain. Its immediate neighbours warned that they were ready to chase the rogue section away from the mountain. In this critical situation, only the overall *monyomiji* assembly and the king could be expected to impose a solution. If they succeeded in finding such a solution, this would have been counted as a political achievement of the mediators. I left the area before the issue had been resolved.

The King as a Segment in a Field Structured by Complementary Opposition

We have seen that in the tripartite division of the Lirian kingdom, the king and his section stand in opposition to the rest of the community. The king offered sanctuary to members of any section that had committed bloodshed and was expected to help them find a negotiated solution. Once agreement was

reached, the king's curse was believed to hit any party that would break its terms.

The weather was the canvass on which the ups and downs in the antagonism between people and king could be read. In the eyes of the people, drought was a symptom of the king's ill will. For the king, it was an indication of the level of animosity among his people, or a sign that taboos – especially those regarding the use of violence – had been violated. As the crisis aggravated, the relationship between the king and the people gradually turned sour. The king pressed the *monyomiji* to set things right. The longer a drought lasted, the more people would join the anti-king camp. If no rain fell for a long time, the *monyomiji* killed the king, saying 'He is killing us, so why should we not kill him?', the typical justification for an act of retaliation. His dead body was left in the bush or thrown in a dry riverbed, just like that of an enemy.[7]

If the *monyomiji* decided that there was room for negotiation, they would approach the king in the same way that they would approach an enemy: a delegation of blacksmiths or women would be sent to open the negotiation process. If the king allowed himself to be mollified, he demanded signs of a change of heart of his people in the form of demonstrations of respect, gifts of cattle or labour. If pressed hard by the king, the *monyomiji* could decide to give him a new wife. The suspense of these rain dramas, with the king posturing as the nemesis of his people while risking being scapegoated, unified the people.

The relationship between the king and the people was reversible in the same way as relations of power between opposed social segments were reversible. The kings of the societies of the *monyomiji* cluster were not *sovereigns*. They were not irreversibly superior to the other members of society, nor were they the passive victims of a sacrificial cult killed like the kings studied by Frazer (1913, Part III), who were killed after their term was over. Kings lived in a state of 'balanced opposition' with their people, an opposition that emphatically included the possibility of the use of lethal force.

In times of prosperity, the king was the ultimate model of his followers. He was honoured with all kinds of gifts. In times of crisis, the relationship between the king and the people turned sour and often became antagonistic, the king blaming particular groups of people for using inappropriate violence or violating taboos, while the people blamed the king for his ill will. If the

crisis persisted, the discontent of the people turned increasingly against the king and ultimately led to his death. In the majority of the twenty-four cases of deliberate regicide that I documented, the victims resisted being killed.[8] They tried to escape or fought back. Even after he was killed, the king was believed to take revenge by leaving a curse on his killers. If the drought continued despite his death, the people offered a sacrifice to alleviate the killed king's anger.

Just as people killed their kings, kings killed people. Killing was an integral part of the balancing of power. In the early phase of colonial administration, a frequent reason for members of the royal family to be disqualified from becoming or remaining government chiefs was their homicidal record.

In *Kings of Disaster*, I showed that regicide had a unifying effect on the regicidal community, at least in the run-up to the killing. This was the case when the Pari queen was killed (Simonse 1992: 367–70; Simonse 2017: 389–93). The victimization of the king is the structural equivalent of the killing of an adversary in a confrontation of complementary segments. In both situations, the possibility of reciprocal victimization maintains the boundary between the adversaries and enhances the corporateness of the antagonists. The double role of the king as antagonist and unifier of his people can be rendered by the very same diagram that Evans-Pritchard (1940a) used to clarify the operation of complementary segmental opposition (see Table 3.2 above).

Table 3.2 Complementary segmentary opposition (from Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 282, Diagram II)

A	B		
The complementary Tribes A and B are united in their opposition to external enemies (*the enemies are not represented in the diagram*) The antagonism between Tribes A and B (and others not shown) leads to occasional warfare that keeps the primary sections of both (only X and Y of B shown here) united.	**X1** The primary tribal sections X and Y occasionally fight, thus unifying their secondary sections X1 and X2 and Y1 and Y2	**Y1** The tertiary tribal sections of Y1 (not shown here) and of Y2 (z1 and z2) remain united because of the opposition between Y1 and Y2	
	X2	**Z1**	**Y2**

The opposition between X2 and X1 keeps the tertiary sections of X2 (not shown) united	The tertiary section z1 occasionally fights z2 thus maintaining the cohesion between its composing descent groups (not represented)
	Z2
	The tertiary section z2 occasionally fights z1 thus maintaining the cohesion between itds composing descent groups (not represented)

The applicability of the diagram used by Evans-Pritchard to the unifying dynamic of kingship confirms our presumption that the dichotomy between societies of Group A and Group B may not be so absolute after all. The logic of complementary opposition also explains why relations with other kingdoms should be handled by the king. The king's structural position as the top-level segment that unifies all the lower-level segments of the kingdom makes him, from the point of view of his fellow kings, the only actor effectively representing the kingdom as a whole and therefore the appropriate person to declare war upon and make peace with.

The diagram only models the unifying role of the king in relation to the territorial sections and moieties, and not in relation to his equally important role in bridging the antagonism between generation-sets.

Compared to some of the Group A polities treated in *African Political Systems*, the kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster appear fragile. Its kings lacked a monopoly over the use of physical force and their legitimacy largely depended on their rain-charisma, while rivalry over the succession was a continuous threat to the integrity of the polity. In *Kings of Disaster* (Simonse 1992: 302–15), I argued that the Lotuho version of the myth of the spear and the bead could be interpreted as a reflection on this fragility. The myth tells the story of the destructive rivalry between two brother-kings and ends with a curse that bans kingship forever from their communities (ibid.: 304–05). Comparing the fortunes of these fragile kingdoms with some of their acephalous neighbours, it is far from clear which of the two should be our preference if we had to look for a safe place to stay. It is likely that societies

on the Upper Nile mutated in both directions, not only from acephalous formations into centralized ones, but also the other way around.

Table 3.3 The king as a segment in a political field structured by complementary segmentary opposition

A	B		
King A and People B are united in their opposition to external enemies who may be organized as kingdoms or otherwise (*the enemies are not represented in the diagram*)	**X1** The sections X1 and X2 are united as moiety X in their opposition to moiety Y	**Y1** The opposition between sections Y1 and Y2 unites their subsections Z1 and Z2	**Y2**
The antagonism of King A and People B unites the moieties X and Y into a single people	**X2** The opposition between X2 and X1 unites the subsections of X2.	**Z1** The sub-sections Z1 and Z2 unite when the Y1-Y2 antagonism flares up. **Z2** The antagonism of Z1 and Z2 unites the descent groups constituent of Z2 (not represented).	

There is a third way to achieve a stable predictable, political situation: the state. Its primeval protagonist is the king.

The King's Will to Power: Tipping the Balance

Since the king's life was permanently in the balance, kings devised strategies to maximize their chances of survival and to save their throne. Among the strategies at their disposal were the following.

Generate Wealth and Create Dependents
As a general principle, the king had to make sure that the balance of power that defined the relationship with his people was in his favour. For that purpose, he needed supporters in the first place. Counting on clan-brothers and village age-mates was not enough. The royal clan was prone to

factionalism when it came to the succession and the *monyomiji* had a mind of their own and could not always be trusted. The king needed men with stronger loyalties: sons, clients and war-captives. To secure these men, accumulation of wealth was a first step. Building on the compulsory nationwide cultivation day, the surplus in the king's granaries allowed him to organize more work parties than average community members and thus accumulate even more grain, part of which was exchanged against cattle. The royal herds were likely to be among the largest in the kingdom. They enabled the king and his brothers to enter into multiple marriages and sire many sons. Last but not least, the king received an important share of the booty brought home from warfare, which included captives.

Kings exploited their people's worries about rainfall by using spells of drought to step up their demands for cattle. The earliest reports of travellers and missionaries speak of kings using the rain to blackmail their subjects (Vinco 1940: 307; Simonse 1992: 195; Simonse 2017: 210). For a young king who was popular with the *monyomiji*, lucky with the rain and calculating in terms of spending his wealth, there were few obstacles to becoming the wealthiest person in the kingdom, even if he had to start from scratch.

The king's wealth enabled him to attract clients. These were young men whose family was unable to raise their bridewealth. They came from within and outside the kingdom. By enabling these men to marry – before or after their warriorhood – a corps of elite warriors was formed that had primary allegiance to the king and inspired respect to enemies, royal rivals and *monyomiji*.

Create a Royal Army Monopolizing the Use of Firearms

The kings were the first to acquire firearms on the Upper Nile. They were often first used against the king's own subjects (Simonse 2017: 209, 219). In the *monyomiji* cluster, we only hear of separate king's armies after the Mahdists had taken control of the army posts on the Nile. King Lomoro of Tirangore had his *Awusa*, King Ogwok of Padibe his *Buchura*, Lojele in Lokiliri his *Makatub*, and the *Amakuta* in Lafon are to have been on King Alikori's payroll. It seems that before the Mahdist period, royal armies did not operate independently of the *monyomiji*.

Create Alliances with Neighbouring Kings

The king's position as the social segment that unified all the others turned him into his community's focal point for foreign affairs and trade. To conduct trade and carry out diplomatic missions, kings spent a great deal of time travelling. This is confirmed by reports of explorers and missionaries. The diary of the missionary Don Angelo Vinco, the first European to travel inland away from the Nile, confirms this. When he arrived in Gondokoro for the second time, in February 1851, he found that King Nyiggilo, whom he had befriended during his earlier visit, had travelled to Loudo for business (Vinco 1940: 302). In June of the same year, Nyiggilo and Vinco travelled together to Lafon, where they were the guests of Mucharabong, the King of the Pari. During their stay at the court, they were visited by a number of kings from neighbouring communities who wanted Father Vinco to come and stay with them (1940: 313). On his return from Lafon later in June, King Legge of Liria tried to ambush Vinco – according to Vinco out of jealousy that he had not included a stop in Liria in his first trip. A month later, he paid visits to Legge, to Lado (the king of Longairo) and to Iban (the king of Loudo) in response to these invitations. During this last trip, he also met the Rainmakers of Cecere (Lulubo) and Lyeparang (Bari) away from home, another confirmation that kings spent a lot of time visiting their counterparts. Baker's journey, twelve years later, in search of the lake that he would name 'Albert' after Queen Victoria's Prince-Consort, followed an itinerary that also corresponded to a royal trade network. He travelled via Legge in Liria and Hujang in Tirangore to Kachiba in Obbo, and from there to Bunyoro on the lake.

These royal alliances had a darker side. In the history of the Lotuho and Horiok, there are different examples of kings who used their allies to punish their own *monyomiji*: Mulak, the queen of the powerful Horiok kingdom of Segele, called on the kings of Longulu and Imatari to help her take revenge on the *monyomiji* of Segele for killing her two sons. King Ngalamitiho of Imatari mobilized not only the *monyomiji* but also the junior generation-set that was about to take over (Simonse, 1992: 197; Simonse 2017: 211) to destroy Segele. The military superiority meant the end of Segele.

The conflict between the two legendary Lotuho princes Facar and Attulang, the protagonists of the Lotuho version of the myth of the spear and the bead, ended when Facar called on the vastly more powerful Toposa to kill his brother. In both cases the norm of proportional response underlying

complementary segmentary opposition was broken by royals obsessed by hateful rivalry.

Centralize the Kingdom

The Lotuho king had a representative in each village-section, the *aboloni hobu*. He was a member of the rain-clan and was selected by the *monyomiji* of his section to serve as their liaison with the king. The king normally had a wife and household in each village. The cultivation day for the king by the *monyomiji* would be performed in their wives' location, sometimes complemented by a day in the fields at the king's main residence.

In its initial stage, centralization was about creating a growing number of direct links between the centre and the different villages and village-sections, thus individualizing each community's contact with the king. This counteracted the possibility of several villages and village-sections building a coalition against the king.

Consolidate the Kingdom's Cohesion by Regularly Waging War on Enemies

The consensual benefits of war against external enemies do not need further discussion here. Numerical and territorial expansion is more easily accommodated by the centralism of kingship than by blocks of tribes uniting to face a common enemy. The orbit of centralism is endlessly expandable. There was little therefore that stopped a successful Rainmaker from claiming credit for the rain falling over an ever widening circle of communities – except the claims of rival Rainmakers. Being based on volatile royal charisma and the vicissitudes of the rain, early kingdoms expanded and retracted at exponential speeds.

Diversify the Social Composition of the Kingdom while Promoting Forms of Division of Labour Based on Complementarity

In their introduction to *African Political Systems*, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard pointed out the greater heterogeneity of the social composition of Group A formations. They noted the ethnic diversity, the incipient social stratification and the presence of castes. All of these elements were present in the kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster.

Castes corresponded to an emerging social division of labour. Their relationship to the society as a whole was different from that of territorial segments. Caste members could not establish matrimonial relations with

mainstream members of the society. Their integration in society was by mutual economic interdependence, a form of *organic solidarity* that was at odds with the *mechanical solidarity* that made complementary opposition tick (Durkheim 1893). It would seem that the Nilotic kings understood that this kind of interdependence served the long-term interests of kingship. The communities of foreigners, the incipient stratification and the castes worked as 'circuit-breakers' in the event of an all-out opposition against the king.

Transform the Royal Court into a Long-Distance Trade Hub

Before the Egyptian penetration of the Upper Nile, the trade in iron objects played an important role in underpinning the power of kings. The Bekat kings of Bilinyan and Shindiru employed a considerable slave labour force in their iron mines and smithies. The establishment and consolidation of Lotuho kingship was also connected to iron working. The iron trade collapsed when cheap iron became available through the Khartoum traders in the 1840s. As an object of trade, iron was replaced by the luxury objects and guns brought from downstream the Nile. These were exchanged for ivory and slaves.

It is likely that there is a relationship between the speed with which trading networks expanded during the first years of Egyptian penetration and the ambition of kings to consolidate their position in relation to their people. The new commodities represented an opportunity for kings to build and widen their networks of allies and clients, and thus strengthen their position in relation to the *monyomiji*. When the *sudd* was blocked in the early 1880s, the stoppage of the supply of commodities had immediate repercussions on the loyalty to the government of the local kings, some of whom joined the anti-government rebellion in 1884.

By the time the Mahdists descended on Equatoria, a multi-ethnic elite had emerged, consisting of allied and intermarrying royals and their middlemen (*tarajma*), who monopolized relations with the government and the traders. These trade relations were taken over by the Mahdists. By the end of the Mahdist period, many of the communities in the *monyomiji* cluster were part of a network of which the Lotuho king Lomoro Hujang of Tirangore was the lynchpin.

Concentrate All Ritual Powers into the King's Hands

The smaller societies of the *monyomiji* cluster (Lulubo, Pari and Lokoya) had a plethora of ritual offices. Each of the Lulubo clans, for example,

claimed a special power that protected the community against specific threats (locusts, crop-eating-birds, leopards, infertility, particular diseases, etc.). Some of the Lokoya polities had up to six kings (*ohobwok*), each with a special cosmic domain. Compared to the small-scale kingdoms, the kings of the larger Lotuho and Bari kingdoms had concentrated most of these compartmental powers into their own hands. Among the Bari and the Lotuho, the only offices that continued to be inherited by non-royal clans were those linked to the original occupation and use of particular stretches of land, mountains and rivers.

In almost all cases, the Rainmaker was the 'king of the kings'. The rivalry for the top office was intense. Except for the Lotuho, most kingdoms had several clans claiming power over rain. Rain-kings sought to centralize the control of rain, often by hook or by crook – by stealing the rainstones of minor rain-clans or by manipulating drought accusations.[9]

The Looming State

The traders allied to the kings arriving from downstream on the Nile and the new underpinnings of kingly power by luxury goods and guns did not automatically translate into a firmer grip of kings over their *monyomiji*. During a drought in 1903, Lomoro's international stature and his 'spick-and-span' army,[10] for example, did not stop the *monyomiji* of Tirangore, from attacking the king and forcing him to quit his capital Tirangore to Loguruny to stay with his mother Queen Iloyi, who was in charge of the rain-shrine there. The Lotuho king Mayya, who had been Lomoro's most important rival, had been killed for rain a few years earlier, followed by his wife. In the same period, Kidi, the son of Alikori, the dictatorial king of the Pari, another participant in Lomoro's network, delivered his father to the Governor of Mongalla Province with the request to exile him because the *monyomiji* wanted to have him killed and put Kidi on the throne (Simonse 1992: 125–26; Simonse 2017: 143).

None of the precolonial kings in the *monyomiji* cluster established *sovereignty*, a definitive, irreversible superiority over the people who had become their 'subjects'. The antagonism in the relationship between the king and the people continued to be played out everywhere as an oscillating balance of power that periodically entered a critical phase when an

interruption to the rainfall would give the *monyomiji* reasons to be suspicious about the king's loyalty.

The power of the king remained embedded in relationships that were handled on the basis of reciprocity, either positive: praise songs, gifts of women and cattle, free labour, as well as all sorts of minor gestures of gratitude (a leg of a hunted antelope, a pot of honey, a calabash filled with termites, etc.) or negative: accusations, acts of defiance, ordeals, beatings and torture, and, ultimately, if the king proved incorrigible, death by mob lynching.

Victimization was part and parcel of the relationship between the king and the people, and it was bilateral, just like the feuding of complementary sections in an acephalous society. The king was not the only potential victim. In his moments of glory, he gave free rein to his capacity to victimize. This could take the form of arbitrary killings,[11] punitive raids against sections of the populace,[12] acts of manslaughter provoked by his anger[13] and executions. The executions at the hands of kings have generally been interpreted by early travellers and anthropologists[14] as instances of the administration of justice. From the fragmentary accounts at our disposal, it would appear that these executions were more like 'reality shows', opportunities for the king to publicly display his power, rather than demonstrations of the force of the law.[15] On the other hand, it has also become clear that there were plenty of opportunities for a smart king to enhance the leverage over his people without acquiring a full monopoly of the use of physical force and for a *monyomiji*-set to cut a pretentious king back down to size.

Having established that societies corresponding to Group A and Group B of the binary classification by *African Political Systems* can be understood as alternative realizations of the same underlying dynamic, we shall now examine the connection between the early kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster and African kingdoms that anthropologists never hesitated to qualify as 'states'. In what ways are our Nilotic kingdoms prefigurations of these 'early states'? What are the continuities and what are the discontinuities between the two systems? Do some of the Nilotic kingdoms qualify as 'early states'? This question seems especially pertinent in the case of the Shilluk kingdom, which has been the subject of considerable anthropological debate. In the next chapter, I argue that the Shilluk kingdom, despite its high population, its historical depth, and the greater stability of its royal succession, had

structurally more in common with the *monyomiji* kingdoms than with kingdoms that anthropologists have labelled 'early states'.

Claessen, an international authority on the study of early states worldwide, counts the kingdom of Buganda,[16] only 500 km south of the *monyomiji* area, as one of the most centralized and differentiated state formations that emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa before the colonial period (Claessen and Skalnik, 1978, 1981; Claessen, 1987). Between the first visit of the explorer Speke in 1862 and the establishment of the Uganda Protectorate in 1894, a large number of travellers, missionaries, government representatives and traders visited the kingdom, many of them leaving written accounts of their observations. By cross-checking the various accounts, we are able to obtain a fairly reliable picture of how the still-independent kingdom functioned.

Of course, by selecting the Buganda kingdom, we are entering Bantu Africa. The comparison we make with Nilotic polities therefore has to be more global and culturally less subtle. Yet we should also take into account that the boundary between the Nilotic and Bantu peoples has always been porous. The kings of Buganda are a case in point, since they claim Nilotic, Lwoo, ancestry. I know of no study that attributes specific characteristics of the Buganda kingdom to this ancestry.

The first eyewitness observations of the Buganda kingdom and its court come from John Hanning Speke, who in July 1862 discovered the point where Lake Victoria poured into the Nile. Before his discovery, Speke had spent four and a half months at the court of king Muteesa of Buganda (1856–84). Muteesa was still a young man ruling under the watchful eye of the Queen Mother. His coronation took place a few weeks after Speke had left the court.

The Buganda king was held in fearful awe. Speke relates that when his caravan approached the royal capital and encountered a royal party, the escorts the king had sent to accompany him hid themselves in the roadside from the king's police. They feared that their mere gaze could be taken as a provocation and as a justification for their execution (Speke 1863: 272). Mock-charges – the usual form of greeting between groups from different communities in the *monyomiji* cluster – were also performed by visitors to the Buganda court. But before performing the assertive charge, the visitors first prostrated themselves flat on the ground in front of the king, grovelling in subordination and 'whining after the manner of happy dogs' (Speke 1863:

256). Only after that did they rise, grabbing their carved sticks 'and screamed and danced in a mimicry of hostile attack against M'Tsé [Muteesa]' (Chaillé-Long 1876: 106). While the last part of the greeting was perfectly recognizable to visitors from the *monyomiji* cluster, the first part must have looked strange, and so did the grotesquely strict court etiquette. Foreign visitors to the precolonial royal courts frequently reported cases of people being sentenced to death for trivial offences (sneezing, laughing, touching the throne, exposing a piece of naked skin, peeping in the direction of the king's wives, etc.). During the morning audiences that Speke attended, Kunsa, the chief executioner, and Ukunsu, his second-in-rank, were always present, ready to implement the king's execution orders. In his travelogue, Speke relates nine occurrences of the king ordering people in his entourage to be executed. A number of these were multiple executions, among them six cases of women, some of them wives and one a sister of the king. Speke, who only occasionally attended the king's morning audiences and who may only have related the more flagrant cases in his travelogue, adds that such executions took place on a daily basis.

On two occasions, Speke begged the king to suspend a death sentence, which Muteesa consented to. One of these cases regarded the son of Kunsa, the chief executioner, and the other to a wife of the king who had joined the king's picnic on the lake to which Speke had also been invited. Her offence was to offer the king a fruit that she had picked from one of the trees on the island where they had moored. Her gesture put Muteesa into a rage. When he was about to hit her on the head with a heavy stick, Speke stopped him by restraining the raised arm. The king then relented (Speke 1863: 395).

James Grant, Speke's companion who had stayed behind with the king of Karagwe to recover from an injury, joined Speke late in May 1862. Grant was lodged next to the torture chamber of the king's 'Chief Detective'. Screaming was heard day and night (1864: 227). Grant relates the case of an army officer who had the temerity to ask for one more slave after the king had rewarded his bravery with one. He was sentenced to being cut to pieces (ibid.: 230). When Grant one day asked the chief executioner about the well-being of his son (the one whose life had been spared thanks to Speke's intervention), the executioner informed him that his son had been executed the day before for another offence. The lightness with which subjects were killed is also evident from the following anecdote related by Grant. One day, when the king, who was fond of hunting with the guns he had received from Speke,

failed to shoot any game, 'he shot down many people' (ibid.: 228). This incident brings to mind the arbitrary shooting into a crowd of spectators by the Bari king mentioned earlier.

For observers coming from the kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster, the murderous outbursts of the king would not have come as a complete surprise. Above I noted various cases of kings who were enraged by trivial offences. But the scale and the cold-blooded routine with which the executions were carried out at the Ganda court must have been utterly confusing to observers, as well as the fact there was no noticeable concern about any retaliatory response from the sections and descent groups whose members were the victims of these actions. Had the whole population become enslaved?

European observers, including Speke and Chaillé-Long,[17] dismissed the executions as mere acts of barbarity. Anthropologists did not know what to make of the extreme violence. This is how Lucy Mair, expressed her perplexity: 'the question of precisely how the cruelties … by the last independent kings were reconciled with the conception of a "good" king expressed at his accession is one that cannot be answered' (1934: 177–78). And Audrey Richards remarked that 'many African chiefs are formally praised for their ferocity to enemies but the insistence that the *Kabaka* [the king] can and should destroy his own subjects is, I think, unusual' (1964: 291).

Other travellers and anthropologists tried to understand this violence as the application of some kind of penal law – as 'punishments'. Punishments, in Africa as well as elsewhere, usually follow a logic of negative reciprocity or of revenge: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' The jurisprudence of traditional African courts is primarily concerned with restorative justice and the resolution of conflict, not with penal law. Lashings as part of court proceedings were a colonial introduction – at least in Southern Sudan. Even there, they often merely served as a demonstration of colonial power (Simonse 1992: 136; Simonse 2017: 152). At the court of the Ganda king, most of the so-called punishments were triggered by what most would consider minor and accidental infringements of court etiquette. Yet these punishments were among the most drastic: death, mutilation or cutting into pieces. The sentences were decreed without any reference to jurisprudence. It is not possible to grasp their significance by considering them as a form of retributive justice administered by the king.

To understand their meaning, we should examine them in the context of the wider role that executions played in the Buganda state. Mass executions occurred regularly. They took place at special occasions such as royal funerals. One of the largest such executions occurred at the renovation of the tomb of King Ssuuna (1832–56), the father of Muteesa in 1880. According to the missionary Mackay (1890: 185), 2,000 people were killed at this event.

Mass executions were also ordered when the king or the mediums of the *lubaale* (official divinities) felt that disorderliness in the kingdom was on the rise. Indicators of such disorder were dirty roadsides covered with excrement, young men loitering in the capital, a rise in adultery cases (especially those involving princesses), as well as reports of a planned insurrection. In Mair's words, they served 'to set the land right' (1934: 233). Executions kept everybody on their toes. They counteracted any tendency to slackness or entropy, and they reset the order of the state to its default setting.

The frequency at which these mass executions took place before they were abolished was estimated by Mair as once every ten years (1934: 179) and by Wrigley (2002: 244) every five to ten years. The missionary Mackay writes that the massacres had been more frequent during the last years of King Muteesa's reign and suggests that they were carried out to help restore the king's health (Ray 1991: 176). His fellow missionary Felkin had a different opinion, arguing that the number of massacres was instead an indicator of the king's good health. Once Muteesa's health had recovered, so Felkin had been assured by his informants, the frequency of executions would increase (Wilson and Felkin 1882, vol. 2: 23).

The mass executions were called *kiwendo*, a term that refers to the fact that the number of victims required for this type of execution was fixed in advance. Roscoe (1911: 333), who wrote an extensive monograph on the Baganda following instructions given by Frazer, mentions a number between 200 and 500. The number was fixed by the king, often in compliance with the oracle of a medium of one of the temples of the Ganda gods. Mediums served the king by identifying and alerting him to threats to his kingdom. Frequently these consisted of suspicions of rebellion and often the mediums were able to name suspects.

To complete the required numbers, commoners were randomly captured in large numbers by the king's executioners from the roads leading to the capital. The work of the executioners was supervised by the king's police. When the quota was full, the king's police chief would sound the drums to

stop the arrests. There were thirteen mass execution sites in the kingdom. Some sites were specific for certain categories of victims: for chiefs and dignitaries, for rebellious princes (who would be burnt or starved to death since royal blood could not be shed), and for wives and friends of the king (a category of victims who would only be executed after a delay of some days to give the king time to change his mind). Other sites catered for a mix of convicted offenders and innocent captives. If Roscoe is to be believed, the demeanour of the victims of these executions was generally cooperative:

> Those who have taken part in these executions bear witness [to] how seldom a victim, whether man or woman, raised his voice to protest or appeal against the treatment meted out to him. The victims went to death (so they thought) to save their country and race from some calamity and they laid down their lives without a murmur or a struggle. (Roscoe 1911: 338)

Before being killed – usually by a spear or club – the victims were made to drink a potion that was believed to give the king control over the victim's ghost. The bodies were left where they fell for wild animals or birds to prey on. Relatives did not dare bury the corpses because they had been given to the gods (ibid.: 336) or to the king (ibid.: 112).

The Ganda kings measured their power in terms of their capacity to victimize subjects. When King Muteesa was shown a photograph of Queen Victoria by the missionary Felkin, he not only asked Felkin 'how she lived, what she wore, and how many servants she had, but also whether she killed many people' (Wilson and Felkin 1882, vol. 2: 18). Muteesa's question confirms the suspicion that the decapitation of the thirty *lubaale* priests during the audience given to Chaillé-Long was meant to impress the *Khedive* in terms of demonstrating the king's power.

Buganda alternated between two contrasting conditions. During an interregnum, it was '[a] wild state of disorder … where anarchy reigned, people tried to rob each other, and only chiefs with a strong force were safe, even the smaller chiefs being in danger from stronger chiefs, who did as they liked during the short interregnum' (Roscoe 1911: 103). The other, opposite condition was called *mirembe*: 'the king's peace'. Together with interstate warfare in which tens of thousands of men were mobilized, *kiwendo* was the principal institution that maintained 'the king's peace', which was believed to be permanently under threat from the forces of disorder.

I believe it is only possible to make sense of these massacres if we see them as rites of consensual antagonism. On the one hand, they were a way of dealing with rivals and suspected rebels; on the other hand, they channelled any inarticulate discontent and animosity in the populace in a single direction – away from the king and towards suspected subversive and disorderly elements. The massacres corresponded to *sacrifices* in the sense given to the term by René Girard. They created a scene in which disorder and the threat of disorder were demonstratively expelled from the kingdom, prompting the survivors to make a fresh start.

In the eyes of an observer from one of the kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster, the Ganda kings had accomplished what many of their own kings were trying so hard to achieve: sovereign control over their people. They had irreversibly tipped the balance of power to their advantage. They had obtained a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force as well as formal immunity to any violence emanating from their subjects. Moreover, the Ganda kings had succeeded with a vengeance: the number of people victimized to maintain order and counteract disaster was immeasurably higher than those in the Nilotic kingdoms, where a single royal victim sufficed.[18]

Was there any trace left in Buganda of the antagonism that defined the relationship between the king and the people in the *monyomiji* cluster? Roscoe's answer to this would have been in the negative. In the passage quoted above, he emphasizes the complete lack of resistance of the victims, as if they agreed to their fate in the interest of the greater good. I believe there is one trace: the fear of the sacrificers/executioners that the victims would take revenge on the king by means of a posthumous curse. This was the rationale for serving them with the potion that ensured that the power released after their death would not threaten the king's peace (*mirembe*), but would be to its benefit. The concern about the effect of the victims' deaths reveals the sacrificial nature of the killing. The forcible ingestion of a king-friendly potion mirrors the precautions taken by regicidal killers in the *monyomiji* cluster. After the Pari had killed their queen, her tongue was pierced by a thorn at two points so that it could not articulate any curse and her stomach, the organ believed to generate blessings and curses, was opened and treated with a fruit that would blunt any imprecation of her people (Simonse 1992: 370; Simonse 2017: 393).

We are now in a position to make a more informed guess as to the meaning of the violent scenes at the Buganda court mentioned above. They mirrored in

microcosm the sacrificial violence that maintained order at the level of the state. The royal execution orders seemed to conform to an implicit court protocol that was based on the idea that, in the interests of his kingdom, an effective king should not miss an opportunity to impress upon his subjects that in the intercourse between sovereign and subject, unidirectionality in the use of violence was the best and only way to maintain and reinforce the integrity of the state.

Laying the Foundations of the State

Once the king had achieved a monopoly over the use of force and had turned his subjects into 'victims in suspense', the way was clear to start building the state. In this final section, I want to briefly touch upon three aspects of this building process as they appear in studies of Buganda history.

The Transformation of the Social Structure of the Kingdom from a Network of Relations Based on Reciprocity into a Comprehensive, Controllable System of Complementary Relationships

In an article written in 1960, the American sociologist Alvin Gouldner proposed an important refinement to the concept of reciprocity by, in the first place, distinguishing the practice of reciprocity from the norm of reciprocity and, in the second place, contrasting reciprocity with complementarity. The concept of reciprocity, according to Gouldner, refers to the sequence of interactions identified by Marcel Mauss in his famous *Essai sur le don*: a gift, recognition and acceptance of the gift by its beneficiary, and the return of a counter-gift by the beneficiary. Each step in this sequence of interactions is contingent on the previous step. Complementarity, by contrast, refers to interactions between partners in a relationship that follow a preset scenario imposed by practical necessity, by tradition, law or by royal decree, and that are dependent on one another.[19] The relations between husband and wife are an example. One nurses the baby, while the other goes out fishing. The nursing of the baby is not contingent on the fishing of the husband and vice versa. On the basis of the *norm* of reciprocity, we are able to make judgements as to whether a complementary role-relationship is *fair* or *unfair* on its partners.

In the *monyomiji* cluster, the relationship between the king and his people is one of reciprocity. The king's rain was a gift that is reciprocated by offerings by his people (wives, cattle, presents, privileges and communal

labour). The king's failure to give rain disrupts the sequence ruled by positive reciprocity and may result in a cycle of negatively reciprocal confrontations that are likely to be justified by the *norm* of reciprocity: 'We shall kill you because you are killing us with your drought.' The negativity is contingent on the perceived performance of the king.

The sovereignty of the king means an end to the Maussian reciprocity in the conduct of affairs that are of common concern to the king and the people. The actions of the king are no longer contingent on those of the people, and vice versa – as this is overwhelmingly the case in the Nilotic kingdoms where the treatment of the king by his people is contingent on the abundance and timeliness of the king's rain and where the king's rainmaking gift is contingent on the love shown to him by his people. In an accomplished state, the relations between the king and the people are ruled by the complementarity of two distinct sets of roles. One set of roles is reserved for the king and his immediate entourage, while the other set defines the behaviour expected from the people. The two sets match like a dovetail joint. They are imposed by the king and their observance is monitored and enforced by the king's courtiers, including the royal executioners, and lackeys. They constitute a *hierarchy*, the ground rule of which is that only the king has the right to decide whether, when, how and by whom violence is used. All others have to obey.[20]

The complementarity of roles opens up the possibility of the organized mobilization of people independently of considerations of reciprocity. It also opens the door for exploitative relationships and for repression. As the complementarity of the king–subject relationship sinks in, the asymmetrical character of the relationship defined by the state becomes an irreversible norm and annexes increasingly larger domains of public life, often to the point that the state's subjects revolt against this, which may prompt the relationship to be renegotiated.

The aspiration to turn the reciprocity of the king and the people into a more predictable complementary role-relationship was already present among the scapegoat kings of the *monyomiji* cluster. The Lulubo king liked to address his people as 'my stable' and 'my ants', implying that he was the herdsman and the queen ant. But when the situation required a humbler approach, he used 'my husband' as a term of address, suggesting a subordinate, complementary role. Complementary interpretations already hovered over a relationship that was still largely reciprocal.

The unilateral complementarity that the monopoly of the use of violence imposed on the intercourse between a sovereign and his subjects not only meant a negation of reciprocity; it also created cultural forms that theatricalized the lack of a common humanity between king and subject – for example, in the funerary arrangements and the installation ceremonies.

While among the Bari, the Lotuho and the Shilluk, one or two close associates of the king were buried with the king, in Buganda all the staff in charge of the king's personal needs – his chamberlain, cooks, firemakers, dairymen and water fetchers, including the wives of these officials – followed the king in his death. But they were not buried alive alongside their dead master as in the Nilotic kingdoms. They were killed at the inauguration of the tomb weeks later, their bodies being left to decompose in the fenced compound surrounding the tomb, like those of the victims of mass executions (Ray 1991: 166).

A similar contrast is evident in the installation ceremonies. At his installation, the Nilotic king was confronted with his ultimate victimhood at the hands of the people. Among the Bari, a ritual was performed in which the most feared diseases were transferred to the king in a collectively recited curse. Among the Lulubo, the uncles of the new king demanded payment of damages for putting his sister's son at the 'centre of evil'.

The Lotuho and the Lokoya started from the premise that their would-be king was a feline monster. Once they had caught him by surprise, they took a lot of sacrificial trouble to humanize and domesticate him into their ruler. Significantly, the installation of the Ganda king followed a diametrically opposed scenario. While he was equated with a leopard like his Lotuho and Lokoya counterparts, the installation rite was aimed at intensifying his feline ferocity, not at taming it. Dressed in a fresh leopard skin, he was given a ceremonial dagger to be able to kill anyone who might resist his power. When the top dignitaries counselled the new king not to be soft on his subjects, they used metaphors that likened the king to a queen termite eating the males that fertilize her since 'commoners (*bakopi*) are like sorghum: Whoever judges them owns them' (Ray 1991: 171). Later, during a nine-day induction tour of the central districts of the kingdom (*okukula*), the new king, who was often only an adolescent, was made to witness killings, to give orders to kill and even to kill himself (Roscoe 1911: 210–14; Ray 1991: 171–75; Wrigley 2002: 147–54).

The Transformation of the Territorial Units and the Descent Groups That Composed the Original Kingdom of Buganda into a System of Clientelism Depending on the King as Its Chief Patron

Earlier I made mention of the liaison officials of the Lotuho king (*aboloni hobu*) who were present in each village section (*amangat*). I presented these officials as evidence of a deliberate strategy towards more central control by the king. The Lotuho kingdoms were the largest and most differentiated of the *monyomiji* kingdoms. In Buganda, similar but far more drastic centralization was already being carried out by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

With the mass executions as a menacing backdrop inspiring a 'centralizing ethos' (Kodesh 2003: 461), the Ganda kings needed relatively little time to transfer the political and territorial power at the local level from the old-time clan and lineage heads (*bataka*) to royal appointees, the *bakungu* and *batongole*. The clans that still acted as powerful corporate groups in the eighteenth century (Wrigley 2002: 221) were reduced to merely ceremonial institutions lacking the capacity to mobilize their members for political ends. The little land that was left in the custody of the *bataka* was used for ceremonies and burials.

The royal appointees were soldiers and pages of the court who had, in one way or another, distinguished themselves in the eyes of the king. Others, according to Wrigley (2002: 221–25), were originally leaders of armed gangs of young men predating on the local population and later regularizing their status by offering the king a part of their booty as 'tribute'.[21] These gangs were the origin and core of the *batongole* chiefly class.[22] The *batongole* were integrated as another layer of 'king's men' (*bakungu*) during the rule of Ssuuna and Muteesa. To manage their land, the *bakungu* and *batongole* appointed clients of their own who were also *bakungu* and *batongole*, but who did not have direct access to the king. Often these second degree *bakungu* and *batongole* had their own clients to cultivate the land. By the early nineteenth century, access to land was almost exclusively through the system of clientelism whose ultimate patron was the king (Médard 2007: 224).

Buganda may very well have been the most centralized state in nineteenth-century precolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of its exceptional character, it has been the subject of numerous anthropological and historical studies, which are beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss here. All I want to demonstrate is that this extremely centralized kingdom can be understood as the outcome of the evolution of an earlier relationship between

the king and the people that functioned as a balance of power. In the case of Buganda, the king succeeded in completely overpowering his opposite number. Only a king who claimed absolute power could have accomplished the comprehensive top-down restructuring of the political economy and sidelined the leaders whose powers derived from constituencies that pre-existed the transformation of the kingdom into a state.

The Control of Succession Rivalry

In the *monyomiji* cluster, rivalry over the succession was the most important threat to the stability of kingdoms, and so it was in Buganda. Eighteenth-century Buganda was torn apart by succession struggles. In the nineteenth century, this problem appears to have been solved in rather drastic ways. The royal clan was dismantled. Henceforth, the king belonged to his mother's clan, not to that of his father, the king. The number of princes entitled to compete for the throne was thus reduced. Brotherly succession was outlawed. The precedent was set by King Ssemakookiro (*ca.* 1800), who simplified his succession by killing all his sons except three. Two surviving sons were left to fight it out, with the winner becoming his successor. A similar scenario was supposed to be played out between Muteesa and his brothers after he was selected king, but it was postponed several times. Speke assumed that Muteesa's brothers, who numbered around thirty, had been burnt at the king's coronation when he and Grant were in Bunyoro (Speke 1863: 543). It was the responsibility of the queen mother (the *Nnamasole*, not the biological mother of the king, but an official in her own right with powers over life and death) to arrange for the elimination of potential rivals.[23] Gordon's emissary Linant de Bellefonds reported in 1875, thirteen years later that several brothers had staged a rebellion against Muteesa and warned that this could very well bring about Muteesa's downfall (Gray 1964: 43–44). It is only at this point that the queen mother, fearing a conspiracy between the brothers and foreign emissaries, locked all the brothers up and starved them to death (Wrigley 2002: 227).

Thus, the view shared by Wrigley and Médard that the Ganda court was able to manage successions from one reign to the next peacefully needs considerable qualification.

Conclusions

The ethnographic material from the *monyomiji* cluster suggests a clear structural continuity between the acephalous sociopolitical systems based on complementary segmentary opposition and the polities centred on the king–people polarity. Both systems functioned as a balance of power between antagonists. Both generated social consensus. The similarity in the cultural practices that enabled people to bridge the two kinds of antagonism (the role of women and blacksmiths as intermediaries, the role of marriage in sealing pacts, etc.) indicates that the people involved understood Groups A and B as being driven by the same force. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard were unable to see this because the structural-functional anthropology they practised concentrated its analyses on the consolidated institutions and norm and belief systems, ignoring the forces that generated and undermined these institutions.

Our approach removes the mystery with which anthropologists, including Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in *African Political Systems*, have surrounded the practice of regicide. Regicide as was practised by the communities of the *monyomiji* cluster is the culmination of an escalating, protracted drama in which the community united itself against its king. It was the final step in a *real* confrontation, not a *ritual* or *human sacrifice*. People would have preferred the rain to the death of the king. Once the route to confrontation was taken, there was no way back. Regicide was 'an inevitable, recurrent tragedy imposed on the society by its antagonistic, centralist structure' (Simonse 1992: 373; Simonse 2017: 396; 2005). Just as the victimization of one or more adversaries was a condition for the operation of the system of complementary opposition in an acephalous society, so was the possibility of regicide a precondition for the operation of early kingship.

Viewing the violence of Ganda kingship as the outcome of a centuries-old antagonism between the king and the people in which the king eventually won the upper hand may remove some of the perplexity that scholars like Mair, Richards and Wrigley felt when attempting to make sense of the mass executions and the violence at the royal court of Buganda.

When examining the massacres from the point of view of the kingship experience in the *monyomiji* cluster, the Buganda scenario must have appeared as a world turned upside down. To the *monyomiji*, the spectacle of regional Ganda military supremacy upheld by people who were treated as disposable slaves by their king must have had a science-fiction quality to it. However, the same spectacle must have strengthened the belief of the kings of the *monyomiji* cluster, who were tired of bearing the brunt of their

people's violence, in the ultimate feasibility of achieving sovereignty over their people.

The Ganda kings did not hide the source of their power. Like their counterparts in the *monyomiji* cluster, they were totally upfront about the importance of the use of violence. Because of their openness on this point, the kings of Buganda have often been contrasted with other African rulers as being 'secular' (for example, Wrigley 2002: 17). The manner in which bodies of the victims of *kiwendo* and the bodies of palace staff killed at the funeral of the king were disposed of indeed suggests a deliberate effort on the part of the king to play down any religious significance their subjects might attach to the victims, as if the acknowledgement of their victimhood could reduce the stature of the king.

This exploration suggests that it is useful to make a distinction between *early kingship* and the *early state* as distinct types of political systems. Early kingship can be defined as a form of kingship in which the balance of power between the king and the people is open-ended. This implies not only that the king lacks the monopoly on the use of physical force, but also that the people are free to confront the king and to oust or kill him. In an *early state*, the king has a monopoly over the use of physical force. The material presented here makes it plausible that early kingship and early statehood are successive configurations in an evolving balance (or should we say 'imbalance'?) of power between the king and the people. Anthropological studies of the evolution of the state normally examine conditions external to the power balance between the king and the people to explain the origin of the state: the development of technology, agriculture, writing, the production of an economic surplus, conquest, etc. External correlates, such as the climate and the conducive fertility of the land, certainly played an important role in state-formation in Buganda, but they were not the driving force behind the process.

With respect to the structural homology between complementary segmentary opposition and early kingship, the material presented here adds plausibility to the assumption that both formations could form an evolutionary sequence. However, the direction of the sequence is not necessarily one-way. In the kingdoms of the *monyomiji* cluster, both configurations of consensual antagonism existed side by side. The Lotuho myth of the spear and the bead (discussed above) seems to suggest that early kingship was fragile and prone to collapsing into segmentary fragmentation and polarization, especially

during periods of rivalry over the succession. From this perspective, it would be worth investigating whether the staunch egalitarianism of the Nuer has had any centralist antecedents.

I am not claiming that the trajectory from acephalous society to state outlined here is the only possible evolutionary route. In *Alur Society*, Southall (1953) described the emergence of *segmentary states*. A king with a reputation for his rain powers and for fairness in conflict resolution attracted peripheral ethnic groups and clans, which placed themselves completely under the king's protection. In return for protection, they offered tributes and services, cementing their relationship with the royal core group by contracting marriages and engaging in other forms of exchange. Segmentary states had the capacity to expand very quickly, forming huge *pyramidal*, bottom-up structures. However, as corporate entities, they remained fragile because their kings had limited control over the use of violence, especially of the more peripheral groups. Under military or political pressure, the segmentary state would simply fall apart into its constituent segments. In contrast, the trajectory covered by the Buganda kingship went straight for the ultimate prize of statehood – *sovereignty* – dismantling, transforming and subordinating pre-existing descent-based sociopolitical units.

In contemporary political crises, solutions are often presented as 'radical' when they are open to the relaxation of the constraints many modern states have put on the victimization of particular categories of citizens – such as the reintroduction of capital punishment, the abrogation of the legal limits set to the state's power to arrest and detain, the designation of particular groups of citizens as targets of persecution, elimination or re-education and such. Ethnographic explorations of the antecedents of the state, such as the comparative exercise undertaken in this chapter, remind us that these beliefs and tendencies are not just figments of a fascist imagination or remnants of barbarism, but that they belong to the default setting of the state in all its historical manifestations, whatever the additional checks and balances that have been brought into play.

Simon Simonse is a social anthropologist who trained in Leiden and Paris. He carried out field work on kingship and social cohesion in the societies of the *monyomiji* cluster in South Sudan while lecturing in the University of Juba. His doctoral thesis 'Kings of Disaster' shows how models derived

from Girard's mimetic theory account for the dynamism that animates both hierarchical and segmentary social structures in South Sudan. He has also taught in Congo, Uganda, Indonesia, Japan, France and the Netherlands. For the last twenty-five years, he has worked as a conflict transformation expert in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

Notes

1. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard mention a third type of society where the largest political unit coincides with a kinship group. This sociopolitical configuration by anthropologists characterized as 'band-societies' only prevails in isolated, small-scale groups and is not treated in *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940: 6–7).

2. Girard's own work is the best introduction to his anthropology: *Violence and the Sacred* (1977), *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* (1987, especially 59–66 on sacred kingship), *The Scapegoat* (1989) and *Evolution and Conversion* (2008, especially Chapters 2 and 3 on hominization). Girard's contribution to Hamerton-Kelly (ed.), *Violent Origins* (1987: 73–145) is a good summary of the ideas that concern us in this study.

3. Hamerton-Kelly (1987, especially 73–145); Girard, *Evolution and Conversion* (2008); Antonello and Gifford (2015a and 2015b).

4. They include the Lulubo (Olu'bo), the Lokoya, the Pari, the Horiok, the Lotuho, the Lomiya, the Ngotira, the Dorik, the Tenet and the Ngaboli (the last five collectively known as 'Lopit'), the Dongotono, the Logir, the Ketebo, the Lokwa, the Lorwama and the, Imotong (the last six collectively known as 'Lango'). All are speakers of dialects of the Eastern Nilotic language that is spoken by the Lotuho, the largest group, except the Pari who like the Shilluk speak a dialect of the Western Nilotic Northern Lwoo group, the Lulubo who are Central Sudanic, and the Tenet who are Surma speakers. At the establishment of colonial rule there were more than thirty independent kingdoms, some consisting of a single agglomeration, others counting as many as fifteen large villages.

5. Examples include the downfall of Segele and Imatari (Simonse 1992: 174, 197; Simonse 2017: 191, 211).

6. Before the colonial period, the settlements were higher up the mountain.

7. For an analysis of historical cases of conflict between kings and their peoples escalating to the point of regicide, see Simonse (1992: 199–206 and 343–73); and Simonse (2017: 214–21 and 369–94).

8. Simonse (1992; 2017, Chapter 17) extensively discusses the different anthropological issues raised by the practice of regicide.

9. Simonse (1992; 2017: Chapter 14) presents a number of cases of theft and extortion of rainstones. In Liria, Hatulang, king of the immigrant settlers, stole the famous Mosidik stone as well as Mosidik's 'husband stone' from the neighbouring royal court of Kamuturu, which was later named 'Langabu', 'the place without king'. Later again, he refused to return rainstones he had borrowed from Madhaira, the Rainmaker of Ongole, the section of Liria inhabited by the original inhabitants who had so far been able to keep 'their own rain' (Simonse 1992: 294–98; Simonse 2017: 315–18). When the rain-clan of Lokiliri demanded a return of the bridewealth when a sickly bride died soon after her wedding, they insisted that they be given the old rain-clan's rainstones (Simonse 1992: 293; Simonse 2017: 314). When the old Rainmaker of Logopi fell into a hot spring and got stuck in

the mud, a passer-by of the rain-family of a neighbouring community demanded the rainstones as a reward for saving his life before pulling him out.

10. Donaldson-Smith (1900: 621).

11. King Logunu of Bilinyan insisted on trying out the gun given to him by the Egyptian expedition on the crowd that had assembled to watch the reception of the foreigners. Werne counted eleven Bari killed and many more injured (Werne 1848: 276–77).

12. In 1863, Prince Adang of Tirangore invited Baker to join in a raid on a group of 'rebellious subjects' (Baker, 1866, vol. 1: 240).

13. Donaldson-Smith (1900: 621) describes how he stopped King Lomoro of Tirangore from killing one of his aides when the latter brought him the wrong tusk that the King wanted to offer as a present for his American guest.

14. For a discussion of the tendency of anthropologists to present royal acts of victimization as judicial, see Wrigley (2002: 243).

15. The following passage from Werne's description of the manner in which King Logunu speared criminals evokes the ambiance of a show: 'He did so very quickly [*goâm*, *goâm*] without any fuss. He would be seated under a big tree with a heavy spear in his hand, to administer justice and would exhibit great anger. Maybe, people believed he was inspired by the great spirit in the tree while he was thus presiding over the court, or maybe, it was rather his own feeling of justice that put him into righteous anger and that made him into the chief executioner of the wrong-doer, although normally the latter's fate had already been sealed by the collective will' (Werne, 1848: 322). Werne did not know what to think of it. It is strange that a king should act as executioner, especially since Bari kings were kept away from war and the sight of blood.

16. In Luganda, the language of the Baganda, the word 'Buganda' refers to the kingdom of the Baganda, which, in the nineteenth century, also included people of other ethnicities. The Swahili word 'Uganda' became the name of the protectorate that was established by the British and is now the name of the country. While Buganda was and is the largest political entity within Uganda, Uganda includes other kingdoms and many other ethnic groups. When referring to the ethnicity of the Baganda in an adjectival form, I use 'Ganda' without a prefix.

17. Chaillé-Long stayed at Muteesa's court from 21 June to 9 July 1874 as the envoy of Gordon, the Governor of Equatoria. During his first audience, thirty priests of the *lubaale* (official divinities) cult were slaughtered, while during his second audience, seven chiefs (*batongole*) were decapitated. Ernest Linant de Bellefonds who stayed in Muteesa's capital from mid-April to mid-June 1875 to follow up on Chaillé-Long's mission to bring Buganda within the Egyptian orbit of influence makes mention of only two executions: one of a person who interrupted a conversation between the king and his secretary, and the other of a tobacco smoker whose smoke irritated the king (Gray 1964: 43–44). There is no mention of royal executions in the account of Stanley, whose stay coincided with that of Linant, nor in Emin Pasha's diary of his short visits in August 1876. From 1876, Muteesa professed to be a Christian and must have abolished the executions during public court sessions. However, the mass executions continued into the early 1880s.

18. In *Kingship and State*, Christopher C. Wrigley, one of the main authorities on Buganda kingship, shares the following enigmatic intuition for which he does not adduce evidence: 'the historically known *kabakas* [Baganda kings] were illegitimate heirs of kings who had not been despots or even rulers, but the suffering servants of their people' (2002: 246). The known *kabakas* are qualified as 'illegitimate' because of their abuse of power when compared with ancestors who were said to have suffered at the hands of their people. Were the early Ganda kings scapegoats of their people like their counterparts in the *monyomiji* area?

19. The reader should be made aware that the term 'complementary' is here employed in a different sense from its earlier use in combination with 'segmentary opposition'. In the latter case, the use of 'complementary' refers to the tendency for symmetrically opposed adversaries to match the segmentary scope when mobilizing for a hostile confrontation. The use of the term in this particular sense was initiated by Evans-Pritchard and was followed by anthropologists working on segmentary societies. Complementarity, as Gouldner defines the term, refers to an asymmetrical role-relationship of which the mutual expectations have been imposed from outside or by the more powerful partner in the relationship.

20. Maybe the king's violent response to the spontaneous offer of a fruit by one of his favourite wives during the picnic on the lake (discussed earlier) can be understood as a manifestation of this tension between reciprocity and complementarity. The gift could not help but evoke the desire for recognition implicit in the gift. The gesture was at odds with the theatre of complementary roles played by the palace kitchen staff, whose expectations were not tainted by notions of reciprocity. It is likely that the less formal, outdoor ambiance of the boat trip and the picnic made the apparently inexperienced queen forget the rigour of the courtly code of conduct.

21. In fact, Speke was instructed by the official called the 'Chief-Detective' by Grant to provision his caravan by confiscating food from neighbouring communities, either with the cooperation of their *bakungu* or directly. As a guest of the king, any community not feeding his group as well as anyone selling (i.e. not giving it for free) food to him was punishable by the king (Speke 1863: 343).

22. The original meaning of the word is 'bachelor' (Médard 2007: 295), which brings to mind the clients of the Nilotic kings who served their patrons to be rewarded with a wife.

23. Speke and Grant note how Muteesa enjoyed spending most of his free time with his brothers, having fun, making music and going out hunting. Grant mentions that some of the brothers were handcuffed and chained and led by servants (1864: 224). Was the queen mother afraid that they would try to conspire against their brother? Grant does not give an explanation, but adds that before he became king, Muteesa also went around chained. This must have been during the period when two parties of provincial chiefs were fighting over which of the two would succeed: Muteesa or his brother Kimera. The succession war was won by Muteesa's supporters. His brother Kimera and his backers were all executed (Wrigley 2002: 227).

References

Antonello, Pierpaolo, and Paul Gifford (eds). 2015a. *Can We Survive Our Origins? Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

———. 2015b. *How We Became Human: Mimetic Theory and the Science of Evolutionary Origins*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Baker, Samuel W. 1866. *The Albert N'Yanza: Great Basin of the Nile and Explorations of the Nile Sources*, 2 vols. London: Macmillan.

Chaillé-Long, C. 1876. *Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People: An Account of the Expedition to the Lake Victoria Nyanza and the Makraka Niam Niam, West of the Bahr-el-Abiad (White Nile)*. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.

Claessen, Henri J.M. 1987. 'Kings, Chiefs, and Officials: The Political Organization of Dahomey and Buganda Compared', *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, 25–26: 203–41.

Claessen, Henri J.M., and Peter Skalník (eds). 1978. *The Early State*. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1981. *The Study of the State*. The Hague: Mouton.

Donaldson-Smith, A. 1900. 'An Expedition between Lake Rudolf and the Nile', *Geographical Journal*, 16: 600–25.

Durkheim, Émile. 1893. *De la division du travail social: étude sur l'organisation des sociétés supérieures*. Paris: Felix Alcan.

Emin Pascha. 1917–27. *Die Tagebücher von Dr. Emin Pascha* (edited by Franz Stuhlmann), 5 vols. Berlin, Braunschweig and Hamburg: Georg Westermann.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940a. 'The Nuer of the Southern Sudan', in Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds), *African Political Systems*. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 272–96.

———. 1940b. *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1948. *The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fallers, Lloyd A. (ed.). 1964. *The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fortes, Meyer, and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds). 1940. *African Political Systems*. London: Oxford University Press.

Frazer, James G. 1913. *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*, 13 vols. London: Macmillan.

Girard, René. 1972. *La Violence et le sacré*. Paris: Grasset; translated as *Violence and the Sacred*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.

———. 1978. *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, Recherches avec JeanMichel Oughourlian et Guy Lefort*. Paris: Grasset; translated as *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* (with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort). East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1987.

———. 1982. *Le bouc émissaire*. Paris: Grasset; translated as *The Scapegoat*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

———. 2004. *Les origines de la culture, Entretiens avec Pierpaolo Antonello and João Cezar De Castro Rocha*. Paris: Desclée Brouwer; translated as *Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture*, René Girard, Pierpaolo Antonello and João Cezar De Castro Rocha. New York: Continuum International, 2007.

———. 2007. *Achever Clausewitz, Entretiens avec Benoît Chantre*. Paris: Carnets Nord.

Girard, René, Pierpaolo Antonello and João Cezar De Castro Rocha. 2008. *Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture*. New York: Continuum International.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1960. 'The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement', *American Sociological Review*, 25(2): 161–78.

Grant, James A. 1864. *A Walk across Africa: Domestic Scenes from My Nile Journal*. Edinburgh: Blackwood.

Gray, John. 1964. 'Ernest Linant de Bellefonds', *Uganda Journal*, 28(1): 31–54.

Hamerton-Kelly, Robert G. (ed.) 1987. *Violent Origins, Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kodesh, Neil. 2003. 'Review Richard Reid, Political Power in Pre-colonial Buganda', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 36(2): 459–62.

Kurimoto, Eisei. 1986. 'The Rain and Disputes: A Case Study of the Nilotic Pari', *Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology*, 11(1): 103–61 (in Japanese).

———. 1998. 'Resonance of Age Systems in Southeastern Sudan', in Eisei Kurimoto and Simon Simonse (eds), *Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa: Age Systems in Transition*. Oxford: James Currey, pp. 29–50.

Kurimoto, Eisei, and Simon Simonse (eds) 1998. *Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa: Age Systems in Transition*, Oxford: James Currey.

Mackay, A.M. 1890. *A.M. Mackay*, letters compiled by J. W. Harrison (Mackay's sister). London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Mair, Lucy P. 1934. *An African People in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.

Médard, Henri. 2007. *Le royaume du Buganda au XIXe siècle, Mutations politiques et religieuses d'un ancien État d'Afrique de l'Est*. Paris: Karthala and Nairobi: IFRA.

Quigley, Declan (ed.). 2005. *The Character of Kingship*. Oxford: Berg.

Ray, Benjamin C. 1991. *Myth, Ritual and Kingship in Buganda*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reid, Richard. 2003. *Political Power in Pre-colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare in the Nineteenth Century*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Richards, Audrey I. 1964. 'Authority Patterns in Traditional Buganda', in L.A. Fallers (ed.), *The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 256–93.

Roscoe, John. 1911. *The Baganda: An Account of Their Native Customs and Beliefs*. London: Macmillan.

Simonse, Simon. 1992. *Kings of Disaster: Dualism, Centralism and the Scapegoat King in the Southeastern Sudan*. Leiden: Brill.

———. 2005. 'Tragedy, Ritual and Power in Nilotic Regicide: The Regicidal Dramas of the Eastern Nilotes', in Quigley Declan (ed.), *The Character of Kingship*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 67–100.

———. 2017. *Kings of Disaster, etc.*, revised and illustrated paperback edn. Kampala: Fountain Publishers; also available as an e-book by Michigan State University Press.

Southall, Aidan W. 1953. *Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination*. Cambridge: Heffer.

Speke, John H. 1863. *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile,* Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons.

Vinco, Angelo. 1940. 'Relazione del viaggio del Reverendo Sacerdote Don Angelo Vinco, Missionario Apostolico fra le varie tribù equatoriali del Fiume Bianco dal principio dell'anno 1851 fino alla metà del 1852', *Annali Lateranensi*, IV: 300–28.

Werne, Ferdinand. 1848. *Expedition zur Entdeckung der Quellen der Weissen Nil (1840–1841)*. Berlin: G. Reimer.

Wilson, C. T., and R. W. Felkin. 1882. *Uganda and the Egyptian Sudan*, 2 vols. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.

Wrigley, Christopher. 2002. *Kingship and State: The Buganda Dynasty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS REVISITED

EDITED BY
ALEKSANDAR BOŠKOVIĆ
AND GÜNTHER SCHLEE

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON STATEHOOD AND POWER

African Political Systems Revisited

Changing Perspectives on Statehood and Power

Edited by Aleksandar Bošković and Günther Schlee

First published in 2022 by
Berghahn Books
www.berghahnbooks.com

© 2022 Aleksandar Bošković and Günther Schlee

Contents